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Limits of Control: Challenges to Spatiotemporal Analysis of Sub-State War
Christian Ickler
Abstract:
Territorial control by violent (non-)state actors (VNSA) in sub-state war features prominently 
in many fundamental concepts in conflict studies. Though there have been attempts to 
measure this phenomenon or at least delimit it from a spatiotemporal perspective, these 
have so far been based either primarily on qualitative expert assessments or rely on dyadic 
event data to determine contested areas. In this methodological research paper, I present 
three approaches that can be used to estimate actor presence on basis of spatiotemporal 
approximation. In doing so, I focus on challenges and obstacles that can be encountered 
when measuring territorial control via the proxy of territorial contestation. Spatiotemporally 
disaggregated violent incidence data is used to analyze a small subsample of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa in order to determine various ways of visualizing territorial contest. Further 
points of discussion include the impact of data aggregation, the availability of context data 
and analytical methods used for these evaluations.
Zusammenfassung:
Territoriale Gewaltkontrolle durch (nicht-)staatliche Gewaltakteure ist Gegenstand einer 
großen Zahl grundlegender Konzepte der Konfliktforschung. Es existieren bereits erste 
Ansätze dieses Phänomen zu messen und raumzeitlich einzugrenzen, jedoch beruhen diese 
Messungen bislang entweder auf qualitativen Einschätzungen von Experten oder – im Zuge 
der zunehmenden Verfügbarkeit raumzeitlich desaggregierter Daten von Gewaltereignissen 
– der Bestimmung umkämpfter Areale auf Grundlage bewaffneter Auseinandersetzungen. Im 
vorliegenden Papier werden drei Ansätze zur näherungsweisen Bestimmung der Präsenz von 
Gewaltakteuren vorgestellt. Dabei wird auftretenden Hindernissen und Herausforderungen 
der Messung territorialer Gebietskontrolle durch den Einsatz von Informationen über den 
territorialen Wettbewerb begegnet. Hierzu werden raumzeitlich desaggregierte Ereignisdaten 
ausgewählter Untersuchungsländer in Sub-Sahara Afrika exemplarisch genutzt, um die 
Möglichkeiten der Visualisierung territorialen Wettbewerbs unter Gewaltakteuren und dem 
Einfluss der Auflösung der Daten nachzugehen. Darüber hinaus wird die Verfügbarkeit von 
gleichfalls raumzeitlich desaggregierten Kontextdaten und entsprechenden Analyseverfahren 
diskutiert.
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1. Introduction
In Somalia, a decades-long civil war between multiple factions has claimed countless casualties 
and caused a great deal of internal displacement. A second look, however, suggests that the 
violence1 is not spreading throughout the entire country, but has been concentrated in locations 
of presumably higher (strategic) “value” such as large agglomerations, the coastline, and the 
border region. The lower Shebelle region and Mogadishu, the former capital, have seen the 
largest share of violence (see Fig. 1, next page).
Though there are a multitude of plausible reasons for this variance, most conflict studies base 
their explanations on the level of contestation between armed groups and that of territorial 
control. From a spatial-geographic perspective, the theoretical interpretations of these two 
aspects can be summarized as follows: The higher the level of territorial control, the lower the 
level of contestation towards the center of control (e. g. Buhaug 2010; Hultman 2008; Kalyvas 
2006). Thus Somalia serves as a good example of variations not only in violence, but also 
contestation and territorial control.
1 Violence is defined as the intentional use of material, physical force on a person by an individual or 
collective, which ultimately leads to the death of that person. Thus only lethal incidences have been 
taken into account. This definition excludes structural (Galtung 1969) and cultural/symbolic violence 
(Bourdieu/Passeron 1973; Galtung 1990). For psychological (e. g. deprivation), sexual, verbal and 
emotional violence, see Gudehus/Christ (2013). The scope of violent incidences ranges from criminal 
to armed clashes, and is used as proxy indicator of the local characteristics of war.
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Figure 1: Violence in Somalia 1990-2010 based on EDACS (Event Data on Armed Conflict 
and Security) (Chojnacki et al. 2012b).2
Despite its key significance, there is currently no available information on the level of control. 
Figure 1 – a visualization based on spatial disaggregated conflict event data – shows only hotspots 
2 Violence in Somalia is concentrated in the central and southern provinces, the coastal region and 
especially close to the capital Mogadishu. Violence tends to occur in proximity to urban areas. 
Rudiments of a “quasi” inter-state war (Menkhaus 2006) have erupted in the northern region between 
the quasi-states Puntland and Somaliland, which Figure 1 highlights as a “disputed area”. This should 
not, however, be misinterpreted or give the false impression that most parts of Somalia were not 
“disputed”.
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of violence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw conclusions about territorial control from point 
data that, if anything, marks the contestation of control.
This paper begins with a brief overview of why this issue is of interest in conflict studies and 
a discussion of the prevalent arguments based on explanatory approaches to investigating this 
topic.3 This is followed by a discussion of various ways to measure territorial contest between 
VNSAs by making spatiotemporal actor presence visible on a sub-state level. I also discuss 
whether this information can be used to gain insight into armed actors’ dominance in space 
over time. Third, I turn to the disaggregation of context data, because the available level of 
geographical and temporal resolution of contextual data provides the accuracy of quantitative 
analysis linking violent incidences to their structural background. Finally, I test the data on 
basis of a spatiotemporal regression analysis and provide an outlook of future challenges.
This paper comes with a number of austerities that will be named in the following. First, the 
conducted analysis does not claim to be profound, nor can the findings be generalized. This 
second limitation is rooted in the small number of countries that serve as case studies in this 
analysis, namely Somalia and Sierra Leone. These countries were selected because armed non-
state actors play a significant role in the conflict dynamics and data is readily available.4 Moreover, 
Somalia – in contrast to Sierra Leone – represents a case with a complex actor constellation that 
is not overlaid by “strong” state actors. Thus these two countries offer different conflict settings, 
with each respectively fitting into different methodological approaches. The second restriction 
to the scope of this paper comes from focusing exclusively on violent non-state actors (VNSA)5 
in sub-state war6 and the limited range of contextual causal variables used, due to the fact that 
the presented results are intended only as examples of the basic principles.
The following pages trace and summarize the conceptual background of territorial control 
and contestation between armed groups. These assumptions are then contrasted with possible 
methodological approaches to approximately measure territorial control proxied by territorial 
contest. Finally, these measurements are evaluated with regard to applicability by concentrating 
on available structural data and the analytical tools at hand. In closing, this work-in-progress 
paper discusses future challenges.
3 Territorial control and contestation are investigated, for instance, in Political Geography or by the 
International Relations (e. g. Huth 1998). Within territorial control lies a tied coupling of statehood 
and sovereignty (Paasi 2003: 113pp.) it is generally utilized to bind space and power together (Agnew 
2000). Its significance is therefore also recognized on the sub-state level (McColl 1969).
4 The analyses are based on the Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security (EDACS) dataset.
5 The term violent non-state actors (VNSA) refers to persons, organizations or armed groups that 
use violence against the monopoly of the state or other non-state actors in an effort to fulfill their 
objectives. Their motives can be materialistic, political, ideological, religious, or a mixture of these 
motivations (Chojnacki 2004). Examples of VNSA include mercenaries, rebels or warlords.
6 For the definition of sub-state war, I follow Chojnacki (2004: 203). It can thus be understood as an 
organized, persistent form of collective violence on an inner- or sub-state level between state and 
nonstate actors within or beyond the administrative borders of a nation-state.
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2. The Contestation of Territorial Control
“War is not all the terror all the time, all over the place” (Korf et al. 2010: 386). In light of this 
characteristic of war, the core question of geographically disaggregated conflict research can 
be framed as follows: What causes the variance of violence – of persistent hotspots of violence 
on the one hand and the temporal absence of violence on the other? One possible cause of this 
variance can be the extent of territorial control by violent (non-)state actors (VNSA).7
A major aim of armed actors, whether state or non-state, is territorial control.8 For many VNSAs, 
successfully gaining territorial control is a crucial step in achieving their aims, as territorial 
control implies control over resources, infrastructure, locations of political- or socio-geographic 
importance, et cetera. At the same time, armed actors are heavily dependent on the cooperation 
and control of the civilian population. Controlling deserted space is only of interest if the area 
harbors resources or has some other strategic or symbolic “value”. Nevertheless, civilians are 
key to successful warfare and war economy. Control of the population can be used to legitimize 
leadership claims and gain political power (e. g. Elwert 1997; Kongsgård 2010).
All of these factors also vary depending on the relative/perceived “value” of a territory and 
thus the level of territoriality put forward by the armed actors. The actor’s military capacity, 
actor constellation and conflict dynamics can raise or lower that relative “value” over time. As 
a consequence, the level of violence – mutual or one-sided violence against civilians – varies 
distinctly. Assuming the territory is of some strategic “value”, territorial control is a central part 
of many theoretical assumptions in conflict studies, though these mostly concentrate on the 
inherent, strategic function of violence.
Nonetheless, conflict dynamics and the strategic “value” of a location are not apparent in all 
circumstances. In instances of one-sided violence against the civilian population, the strategic 
“value” of a location is no longer the major explanation for violence at that specific place. In 
such cases, diverse ethnic/ethno-linguistic affiliations,9 socio-economic interdependencies and 
the political objective held by armed groups (or their need for legitimacy) can become more 
relevant.
Conflict studies have identified a set of at least four distinct (possibly concurrent) strategic 
drivers of territorial control on a sub-state level: the interaction between armed groups and 
the civilian population (ranging from control to ethnic cleansing and vengeance), competitive 
resource allocation (to extract, produce, and mobilize assets), procuring a military advantage 
7 Other relevant predictors – including the effect of terrain, state actors, external constraints, different 
distribution of target resources et cetera – go beyond the scope of this working paper and have been 
intentionally left out.
8 Exceptions to this include terrorists and criminal organizations, which do not depend primarily on 
territorial control (though they may welcome it), such as, for instance, the militant Islamist group 
Ansar Dine in northern Mali in 2012 (BBC 2013).
9 The transition from civil war violence to ethnic conflict does, however, become blurred at this point 
(see Kaufman 1996).
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(over specific locations and infrastructure), and objectives related to legitimization (regarding 
secession, concessions, or the symbolic nature of the territory). These functions are interwoven 
and, to a certain extent, derive from the first driver, as different forms of interaction are the basis 
for resource allocation, military confrontation within populated areas, and the legitimization of 
one’s own rule.
Explanations for the strategic use of one-sided violence against the civilian population focus 
on different forms of interaction between armed actors, their opponents and civilians. Despite 
the link between these forms of interaction, there should be a clear differentiation between 
(indirect) armed contestation and terrorizing the local population. The aim to control and, if 
necessary, to punish perceived infractions by the population depends on the VNSA’s ability 
to project power within geographic zones of (temporal) territorial control (Boulding 1962; 
Buhaug 2010; Kalyvas 2006) or to selectively target population which is assumed to support the 
adversary (Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2006). Wood (2010: 604), on the other hand, asserts that armed 
groups abstain from targeting civilians if they are able to provide security and control territory. 
Another strategic, interaction function of one-sided violence concentrates on killing civilians 
as a means of communication between armed groups. Defeat in battle (Ziemke 2008) or the loss 
of territory can be compensated by raising costs for governments (or local armed actors) or by 
targeting civilians and thereby undermining the population’s support and trust towards the 
opponent (Hultman 2007: 210).
Controlling civilians can also be a way of extracting resources (Azam/Hoeffler 2002). The “value” 
of a territory determines whether or not armed actors are willing to invest in its occupation and 
defense. The defensive strength and further deployment of troops lowers the potential desire 
of other armed actors to attack the territory. This investment in measures of deterrence could, 
however, tempt adversaries to attack elsewhere (Powell 2008: 1). The nature of the territory and 
resources at hand are decisive for the intensity of violence that can be expected (Ross 2004). 
In contrast to remote, rural areas or areas of low (strategic) “value”. small geographic areas of 
relatively high “value” can lead to an intensified competition between the armed actors fighting 
to gain the territorial control (Skaperdas 2002: 438). Examples include, for instance, urban 
agglomerations, which inherently have a high population density and thus a higher GDP per 
capita. This is associated with local conflict escalation, while the economically-driven goal to 
increase market shares motivates armed groups to redouble their organizational capacities and 
to invest in territorial control. This second process is systematically linked to a decrease in one-
sided violence and the defeat of potential rivals (Branovic/Chojnacki 2011).10
Besides the aforementioned interaction/control function and allocative/exploitive drivers – 
which can overlap if the purpose of the resource allocation is not limited to raiding and looting 
– territorial control is of course also important when it comes to gaining military leverage. 
It is essential that armed actors have a safe haven and a base for preparing planned/ongoing 
10  Additional factors include many more aspects such as the lootability of resources (see e. g. Humphreys 
2005) and the specific actor constellation. These should be taken into consideration when evaluating 
the “value” of a specific location and determining the nature of the inherent conflict dynamics.
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operations. Armed actors’ perception of the (actual) conflict situation is also significant, as 
territorial setbacks (Hultman 2007) or the proximity of the armed actors’ headquarters (Buhaug 
2010) and other strategically important sites (e. g. infrastructure, administrative centers, …) can 
stir local conflict escalation.
Finally, territorial control is the basis upon which armed actors gain legitimacy and acceptance 
by third parties; this can be the primary goal in secessionist conflicts, at least initially. All of these 
strategic functions (and perhaps others not mentioned here) are interlinked with territorial 
contest and control by armed actors. Factors that (in-)directly affect the armed actors and thus 
their ability to consolidate their local regime are manifold. The complexity of these driving 
factors is not discussed in this paper. For more details, see Bakke et al. (2012), Branovic and 
Chojnacki (2011), Cunningham et al. (2012), Fjelde and Hultman (2013), Fjelde and Nilsson (2012), 
Kalyvas (2006), Mampilly (2011), Pearlman and Cunningham (2012).
3. Exploring the Contestation of Control
Displaying territorial control is first of all tied to the analyst’s ability to display territorial 
contest, which delimits the outer boundary of controlled areas. This option has recently become 
a possibility with the proliferation of reliable, spatially and temporally disaggregated event 
data on violent incidences in the context of intra-state war. There is, however, a distinction 
between displaying territorial control and delimitative proxy territorial contest. It takes another 
conceptual leap, and sometimes a lot of imagination, to gain an approximate measure of 
territorial control, if any.
Some datasets, like the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et 
al. 2010) or the Social, Political and Economic Event Database (SPEED) Project (Nardulli et al. 
2011) also code non-lethal violence or even information concerning the location and timing 
of rebel base establishment or the capturing of a town. But this additional information comes 
with a slight caveat, namely the sometimes deteriorated data quality and biases due to the 
lack of reliable, consistent news coverage of non-lethal events, usually on account of their low 
newsworthiness (for a discussion see e. g. Barranco/Wisler 1999; Chojnacki et al. 2012b; Eck 
2012; Öberg/Sollenberg 2011).
The Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security (EDACS) coding criterion controls for many 
inconsistencies and sources of bias, which can lead to fake trends and propagating errors (see 
Chojnacki et al. 2012b) as does the UCDP Georeferencing and Event Dataset (UCDP-GED) 
(Melander/Sundberg 2011). This paper uses EDACS data, as the small number of case countries 
is irrelevant. Both the data quality and consistency of the EDACS dataset and its country sample 
are well-suited to testing the methodological approaches outlined in this paper.
EDACS is comprised of seven countries (among them Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia) from 1990 to 
2010. Two countries in the EDACS sample (namely Somalia and Sierra Leone) are particularly 
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pertinent here for several reasons: First, violence is persistently carried out between multiple 
factions. Second – and this is especially true for Somalia – the governmental forces do not 
preponderate the conflict dynamics. Their impact on local conflict dynamics is comparatively 
marginal relative to the non-state contest. In other countries, regional patterns tend to be 
superimposed by the state, which often serves as point of reference for competing armed actors.
EDACS differentiates between different types of violence, ranging from mutual violence to 
several kinds of one-sided violence. An EDACS event is defined as a “violent incident at a specific 
location and a specific time with at least one fatality resulting from the direct use of armed 
force” (Chojnacki et al. 2012a: 3).11 The focus is on the reliability and accuracy of the coded event 
data, which is why every violent event is coded by two different coders. The coded information 
is based on reliable international news sources such as BBC Monitoring, the New York Times 
and others. The following section briefly describes several approaches that might help with the 
task of identifying territorial control, as soon as they are evaluated and automated.
First, armed conflict can be thought of as space-time-clusters. In addition, dominance by one or 
several armed actors within these clusters can be regarded as a form of temporary control. The 
sequential succession of the dyadic violent incidences between two armed actors can be used to 
identify the dominant actors. These show which actor was attacked by assorted opponents and 
was therefore most likely present in that cluster in the time window between the events.12 The 
left side of Figure 2 shows fuzzy spatial clusters13 of violent events; the right panel shows violent 
events that belong to the same temporal clusters. Combined, these events can be grouped 
as spatial-temporal clusters. This cluster approach can be particularly helpful in detecting 
diffusional processes and identifying regions that are notably of high (strategic) value (see e. g. 
Buhaug/Gleditsch 2008; O’Loughlin et al. 2010; Schutte/Weidmann 2011).
11 The EDACS “dataset contains detailed information on 1) dates, intensity and type of military action, 
2) actors and targets and 3) the geographic location” of violent incidences (Chojnacki et al. 2012a: 3). 
For further details on the EDACS coding process, see Chojnacki et al. (2012b) and the project website 
www.conflict-data.org.
12 Alternatives to this stepwise clustering approach include, for instance, scan statistics (Kulldorff/
Information Management Services Inc. 2009) or spatiotemporal hotspots in ArcGIS 10.X (ESRI 2011), 
though results are rather meager due to the fact that space-time cluster radiuses are heavily skewed by 
geographic outliers and cluster construction cannot be easily automated, especially with the help of 
SaTScan.
13 Clustering is generally based on membership to a specific group of entities with similar attributes, 
in this case event coordinates and event dates. The closeness of events in time and space is assumed 
to be random. This is called complete spatiotemporal randomness (CSTR). Deviations from this 
random distribution indicate clustering. The interpretation that can be drawn from this “closeness” 
is that events that are closer in time or space have more in common than events that are further away 
from each other (Tobler 1970), and can therefore be grouped. C-means fuzzy clustering (Bezdek 1981), 
the method used here, is an unsupervised divisive clustering method. Once the analyst chooses the 
number of clusters, an algorithm determines the most likely cluster centers and evaluates the distance 
of each object to each center. It is an extension of K-means clustering (MacQueen 1967). “Fuzzy” refers 
to the fact that it does not assign events to a definite group, but uses weights of relative membership 
for each event.
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Figure 2: Spatial (left) and temporal (right) clusters in Somalia 1990-2009 (based on EDACS 
event data).
Figure 3 shows two options for visualizing territoriality. On the left, you see the operating range 
of the major armed actors in central Somalia in the years 2008 to 2009. The operating range 
is based on the first, standard deviation of the geographic range where violent events with one 
of the major armed actors take place. It represents an equivalent to the gravitational field of 
actor-specific actions within the time window under study. The right map shows dyadic conflict 
polygons for an analog space-time window. They are similar to the UCDP conflict sites (Croicu/
Sundberg 2012).14
Figure 3: Operational range and dyadic conflict setting of major armed actors in south 
central Somalia 2008-2009 (based on EDACS event data).15
14 The UCDP conflict sites (Croicu/Sundberg 2012) also differentiate geographic areas, which are formed 
on basis of dyadic violence between armed actors.
15 In both maps, it becomes obvious that at that time, al-Shabaab militias dominated the lower Shebelle 
region and the area around Mogadishu. Shortly after this time frame, they allied with Hizb al-Islam, 
whose operational range matches that of al-Shabaab.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 66 • November 2014  |  13
Both visualizations show which areas are highly contested. In the map on the left, the 
overlapping of operational ranges gives us a hint of who contested who. The same is true for 
the overlapping of the conflict polygons in the map on the right. They also show which actor 
was dominant and persistently active in a region and how the frontlines between opponents 
change over time. These maps allow us to draw conclusions about the actors’ military capacity 
and mobility (e. g. Boulding 1962; Buhaug 2010; Buhaug/Gates 2002; Gent 2011; O’Loughlin et 
al. 2010). Yet these two approaches only allow us to measure territorial contestation. They do 
not provide information about territorial control as pacification or alliance building between 
formerly fighting actors, or the withdrawal of one side for various reasons. Furthermore, this 
approach is only applicable in complex actor constellations with more than two actors.
In complex actor constellations, statements about actor specific presence can become blurred 
or even indistinguishable depending on the bustle of the course of the conflict. In dyadic or less 
complex actor constellations, it is easier to draw conclusions about the direction of operations, 
and a more precise attribution of actions by actors is easier to come by. In light of this, we turn 
to a better-suited sample, the less complex case of Sierra Leone, where it was primarily the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighting the government.
The third solution presented here provides a more actor-specific spatiotemporal visualization 
of contestation. It is based on creating cone-sections that mirror the spatiotemporal trending 
of dyads. The cone-sections can help identify the small but distinct spatial sections, which 
– provided the geocoding of the event data is accurate – are presumably under control by a 
specific armed actor shortly before the event takes place. This distinguishes it from the type of 
information provided by UCDP conflict sites, which only show multiple overlapping areas of 
dyadic contest (cf. right map in Fig. 3).
Figure 4: Illustration of the “cone-cutting-technique”.
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Figure 4 illustrates how the cones are generated. The “cone-cutting technique” builds on buffers16 
placed around dyadic violent events that are attributed to specific dyads between armed actors. 
These events are labeled t1 to t4, numbered according to their chronological order. The buffers 
are split using stationary lines that are drawn perpendicular to a trend line (central arrow) of 
the specific dyad and split again on basis of the connected way the dyad successively takes 
through space (dashed lines).17 Using this method, sections of the cones can be attributed for the 
time-window between two events to a certain armed actor. One-sided violent events committed 
by one of the actors within the range of the buffers can help adjust its radius and check for 
inconsistencies.18
Figure 5: Cones of dyadic trending in the eastern part of Sierra Leone exemplified for the 
dyad: Revolutionary United Front (RUF) versus the government of Sierra Leone in 1995 
(based on EDACS event data).
16 The size of the buffers is based primarily on the geo-precision of the EDACS data, which in many 
cases is around 25 km, due to the accuracy of the gazetteer data (NGA 2011) employed in the process of 
geocoding (see Chojnacki et al. 2012a). Another argument for adjusting the buffer can be made based 
upon e. g. the military capacity and local transport infrastructure, allowing for multi-local operations 
and the time necessary to deploy troops.
17 The plane angle of the cone-sections is constructed on the one hand via the chronological movement 
of the dyad in space, and on the other hand narrowed down by the overall trending of the armed 
contest.
18 EDACS data codes the “active” side in an event, provided respective information is available and 
reliable. But this is not always the case, which is why this additional information can only be used as 
an accessory.
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Figure 5 shows the resulting cone sections, with the example here illustrating the dyad 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) versus the government of Sierra Leone. Combined with 
additional data on one-sided violence, one sees that the RUF is committing mostly one-sided 
violence near and within the areas attributed to them. It becomes obvious how the dyad is 
moving southwards over time, concentrating around the district capital of Bo. This trend 
coincides with and is followed by crucial developments in the Sierra Leone Civil War. South 
African mercenaries and Executive Outcomes (EO) entered the war after the RUF seized control 
over resource-rich areas in the south west of Sierra Leone in the beginning of 1995 (Hsiao et al. 
2002). Combined forces of mercenaries, Kamajor militia and government forces drove back the 
RUF, recapturing RUF strongholds such as Bo. This ultimately led to the defeat of the RUF and 
the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996 (Korniotis 2007).
The construction of dyadic trending cones has yet to be automated and thus remains a time 
and labor-intensive endeavor. Though the level of empirically-saturated research findings 
has been rather meager to date, there are a number of imaginable applications for these actor 
specific-insights on movement-based presence. Again, reflections concerning the impact of the 
diffusion of violence and the military capacity (see above) seem to be the most prominent link 
to existing research here. Beyond that, qualitative reports on armed actors can be empirically 
boosted by this information. Although disaggregated conflict event data is helpful in showing 
the use of deadly force and allows us to measure contest, it sheds little light on actual territorial 
control. In order to gain further insight, we would need additional information that would 
allow us to classify these measurements.
4. Limits of Disaggregation
Approximate information about dyadic local onset, i.e. the where and when of actors contesting 
each other’s territorial control, is of limited use. Additional context information is needed to 
better understand these exploratory findings (e. g. data on the civilian population, the location 
of lootable resources, or the economic prosperity of an area). This would, for example, allow us 
to identify prosperous areas with no fighting and use this as a proxy for pacification in areas 
presumably controlled by one party. Yet the available context data is rather rough or missing 
altogether, which brings us to our next step: looking at possible ways to gain spatiotemporally 
disaggregated context data.
The problem is twofold: first, creating sufficient data for analysis, and second integrating the 
data without introducing measurement errors or biases. Before we come to the data-generating 
methods (especially as a way of coping with missing data) we will discuss caveats and problems 
associated with data aggregation in general. The question of whether or not the variance of the 
phenomena under study is linked to the data-generating process or the level of aggregation is 
not entirely new. Although ecology and geography have dealt with this particular problem of 
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a so-called ecological fallacy19 for decades (Lennon 2000), no best practice solutions have been 
found – only advice as to what not to do.
One basic problem is how spatiotemporal data in general can be joined and aggregated20 
without changing the resolution and attributes of the phenomena. Taking the monthly average 
of the fatality count in order to proxy the conflict intensity will obscure the actual intensity of 
war on a daily basis. A hundred casualties on one day equal 25 casualties on four days, which 
no longer reflects the reality. In a different spatial domain (e. g. when transferring point event 
data into raster-cells or administrative units) the inherent geo-information can be drastically 
reduced and as a consequence topological relations become distorted or even lost altogether.
Gotway and Young note: 
“changing the support of a variable […] creates a new variable [which] is related 
to the original, but has different statistical and spatial properties” and “how the 
spatial variation in one variable associated with a given support relates to that 
of the other variable with a different support is the change of support problem” 
(Gotway/Young 2002: 634).
This unintended change to the basis of the analysis is too often done without acknowledging 
the consequences and propagating biases, which can make meaningful interpretation of results 
virtually impossible. Common “solutions” to this problem include choosing the smallest 
common factor or (simply) pooling data without taking the differences in the level of support 
into account.
Event data is especially susceptible to a large range of biases. These include description and 
selection bias (Earl et al. 2004: 67), plus problems of event localization, temporal inaccuracy, and 
actor differentiation (see Chojnacki et al. 2012b). One example is urban bias (Kalyvas 2004) due 
to the higher precision of city-level data, but also the well-known, difficult-to-avoid problem 
of the higher likelihood of international media coverage of events near urban agglomerations. 
Urban bias can be deceptive, leading to the erroneous assumption that violence is concentrated 
in cities while remote, peripheral areas are completely calm and relatively unaffected by war.
Using the approximate measures of territorial contestation described above raises the question 
as to whether these are valid and valuable units of analysis. There are two major problems here: 
the first is endogeneity – when using these data-driven units of analysis. A second problem that 
arises has to do with the arbitrariness of the unit of analysis, leading to incongruity with most 
19 This is mainly caused by misleading impressions based on spatially homogenous data. See also the 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) (Lennon 2000; Wu/Hobbs 2007: 117pp.). The core of this scaling 
problem is the discrepancy between level of analysis and actual real-world occurrence (Madelin et al. 
2009: 647).
20 Every type of aggregation is always also a transformation. In most cases, this is a smoothing filtering 
function (Madelin et al. 2009: 647, 654).
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kinds of available context data. These measures prove to be helpful, however, for exploratory 
spatial data analysis (ESDA).21
After covering problems of data aggregation and the issue of choosing the “right” unit of 
analysis, we turn to contextual data and its level of spatiotemporal coverage. Although highly 
disaggregated (sometimes biased) conflict event data is readily available, context data is not. 
Despite the enhanced availability of high-resolution remote sensing data in recent years, there 
is still one major obstacle when it comes to the contextualization of conflict event data. There 
is no data available due to differing data resolution and missing retrospective data (such as data 
from the 1990s, for example).
The discrepancy between various levels of spatial and temporal support is even more pronounced 
when comparing data of social and political phenomena, which are normally based on macro-
data (e. g. data on statehood, governance indicators, and so forth) with geographic variables 
on spatial entities at the micro-level (e. g. altitude, precipitation, or population density), as the 
latter has a much higher resolution.22
Spatial interpolation and temporal imputation can allow us to overcome this problem, 
facilitating a more fine-grained spatiotemporal resolution for analysis based on the smallest 
common factor. In the following, I will illustrate how to gain the necessary spatiotemporal 
support. The spatial interpolation can be performed using Geographic Information Systems 
such as ArcGIS (ESRI 2011) or statistical programming languages as R (R Development Core 
Team 2011). While some degree of aggregation seems unavoidable, I am using raster cells per 
month as unit of analysis. In this example, the raster cells are sized 25 square kilometers.
For temporal imputation, I use the R-package AMELIA II (Honaker et al. 2011). Below you will 
find an example of temporally (Fig. 6) and spatially (Fig. 7) interpolated GDP/capita data. GDP/
capita data reflects the economic development on a state or regional level, and thus can be 
used as a proxy for the absence of one-sided and mutual violence – a necessary condition for 
economic growth.
21 Another option for retrieving a maximum amount of information consists in merging the event vector 
points with random points. The downside of this approach is that it comes with an enormous increase 
in data points. This is particularly true in a spatiotemporal analytical framework, where the increase 
amplifies the need for computing capacity and boosts an already surmounting zero-excess, skewing 
the statistical distribution and contradicting statistical assumptions.
22 As mentioned, besides this variation of data resolution between different types of contextual datasets, 
there is an inherent variation in the accuracy of information on violent incidents. The reason for this 
is that some events can only be localized in an approximate way, as they last several days or take place 
throughout an entire region (Chojnacki et al. 2012b).
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Figure 6: Interpolated times series of G-Econ data for Somalia (1990-2010).
Like the aforementioned demographic data, the majority of (socio-)economic data is spatially 
invariant or aggregated temporally. Thus the Gross Cell Product (GCP) taken from the G-Econ 
dataset23 (Nordhaus 2008) is an exception in that it is spatiotemporally disaggregated and can 
be used for the integration of economic factors in likewise disaggregated analysis.24 G-Econ 
is based on estimates of economic performance in billion U.S. dollars for raster cells, each 
covering one time one decimal degree for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000, and for many countries 
the year 2005 as well.25
The value of the GCP equals the “gross value added in a specific geographical 
region; gross value added is defined as total production of market goods and 
services less purchases from other businesses […] GCP also equals the incomes of 
factors of production located within the region” (Nordhaus et al. 2006: 6).
Temporal gaps aside, the geographic resolution of G-Econ does not correspond to the raster 
utilized in this paper. In order to cope with this lack of spatial precision, the centroids have 
23 Beyond that, G-Econ comprises also geographic, socio-economic and demographic variables (http://
gecon.yale.edu/). Substantial inconsistencies are indexed in G-Econ via a quality-variable (Nordhaus et 
al. 2006).
24 An alternative to G-Econ is Night Light Emission Data (NGDC 2011). But on close inspection – especially 
in the DR Congo – the data contains only a fraction of the human settlements in the region (possibly 
due to the forest canopy) and is therefore only of supplemental use.
25 Missing values for the years 2005 and 2010 are linearly extrapolated by the difference between the values 
of the periods of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 (e. g.: (GCP2000 - GCP1995) + GCP2000). The extrapolation 
has been conducted in consistency with plausibility checks on the results.
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been interpolated with the help of Empirical Bayesian kriging.26 As a result, the data is spatially 
joined with the raster used here and the mean value calculated for each raster cell respectively 
(Fig. 7). 
Figure 7: Spatially interpolated G-Econ data for Sierra Leone and Liberia for 2005.
Another example of where this technique can be implemented is population density data. 
Besides a multitude of other variables, population density is often used as a variable for 
contextualizing violent events in conflict science, as it provides information on the population 
at risk in an area.27 For the population data, I have done the same as described above for the 
G-Econ data. Yet more work has to be done to introduce a more realistic representation of 
the spatial distribution of the phenomena, and population density is a good example for that. 
Population density has to be recalculated not on basis of the area of the raster cells, but on the 
perimeter of settlements (Linard et al. 2012) and roads (CIESIN et al. 2012). This would disregard 
empty space and calculate only population density for actual inhabited space. After generating 
and appropriately adjusting spatially and temporally disaggregated context data, the problem 
26 Empirical Bayesian kriging (EBK) differs from other kriging methods in that it does not use “weighted 
least squares”. Parameterization is carried out automatically with “restricted maximum likelihood” 
(REML) by splitting the data points in neighbor groups and subsequently simulating the values. 
The error of estimation of the semivariogram is included in the calculation, thus avoiding an 
underestimation of the standard errors (ESRI 2011). The EBK calculation is done using ArcGIS 10.1, 
including eight neighboring sectors and performing a lognormal transformation, 100 iterations for 
optimization and checking for outliers resulting in small standard errors in cross-validation. The 
G-Econ interpolation has been done for a 5 km- or 0,045° decimal degree raster.
27 The gridded population of the world, version 3 (GPWv3) from the Center for the International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University provides a five-year increment, 
worldwide coverage and up to five-times-five kilometer geographic resolution (CIESIN 2011). The 
data gathering and estimation techniques used (and consequently the quality of data provided by 
public authorities or international organizations) can be affected immensely in civil war areas. 
Strong fluctuations of the population density due to refugee movement and temporary, spontaneous 
campsites can distort official numbers even more.
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remains: data concerning violent incidences cannot be projected in a comparable way. The 
following example of an explanative spatiotemporal analysis will illustrate this problem.
5. Explanative Spatiotemporal Analysis
The analysis of spatiotemporally disaggregated conflict event data – even when combined 
with disaggregated context data – comes with yet another problem, namely an (unavoidable) 
zero-excess within the count data of violent incidences. Because of this, spatial Tobit models 
(Wilhelm/Godinho de Matos 2013) or models following a negative binomial distribution (e. g. 
Croissant 2010) are an appropriate choice. However, in a spatiotemporal setup, this circumstance 
requires procedures that have yet to be fully incorporated into statistical software packages and 
thus are not addressed in this paper.28
The spatiotemporal approach also requires the specification of a sensibly-chosen spatial 
neighborhood and time frame that is assumed to have an effect on the analyzed observations. 
One must define what is regarded as geographic proximity or neighborhood (see Getis 2009) 
and what is considered a short or long-term effect (see Shellman 2004). For the sake of simplicity, 
this paper uses binary contiguity weight matrices. But again, this choice must be considered 
carefully and can distinctly alter results and their interpretive range, which resembles the 
impact of the level of aggregation (cf. section 4).
The following shows a regression analysis testing whether one-sided violence is influenced 
by the number of violent non-state actors (NOVNSA); covaries with the fighting intensity, 
proxied by the number of mutual fighting events (FIGHT) and military deaths divided by the 
number of events (ESCALFIG). Interpolated data is used as contextual background, namely the 
average Gross Cell Product (AVG_GCP) and the average population density (POP_DENS). The 
dependent variable in this setup is one-sided violence against the civilian population (ONE).29 
The regression is performed on basis of a spatial fixed and a spatial random effects lag model 
(Millo/Piras 2012) as exemplified in the case of Somalia.30 The variables are lagged to avoid 
simultaneous causality; the square root of the context variables is taken (due to their skew 
distribution) and outliers have been removed.
28 For instance, Bayesian MCMC methods could be used for that (Hadfield 2010).
29 Endogeneity should not be a problem here, because (a) inter-group violence (incidents) is used 
to establish violent group presence and activity in a given spatiotemporal context; this is used as 
independent variable and (b) the dependent variable is a special category of violent incidents, i. e. 
violence by armed groups against the (unarmed) population and this is likely different from (a). Using 
mutual violence in one region as dependent variable could, however, cause endogeneity, given the 
linkage between an increase in the number of armed actors in one region and the probability of their 
contestation.
30 To analyze the linkage between conflict intensity, contest and context, hypothesis can be tested as the 
following: the number of armed actors is expected to decrease in short-term, as one-sided violence 
against the civilian population is used to consolidate territorial control and regional dominance. One-
sided violence is expected to decrease in the long run, however, along with the number of actors. The 
latter assumption reflects the growing organizational capacities of armed actors, but also their need 
for more productive resource allocation and support by the civilians under control (cf. section 2).
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Table 1: Results of spatial panel fixed and random effects lag models (Millo/Piras 2012).
Variable SPFE-Lag SPRE-Lag
(INTERCEPT)
0.002**
(-0.001)
NOVNSA_LAG
-0.027***
(-0.002)
-0.042***
(-0.002)
FIGHT_LAG
0.062***
(-0.001)
0.105***
-0.001
ESCALFIG_LAG
0.005***
(-0.001)
0.004***
(-0.001)
SQRT(POP_DENS)
-0.03* 
(-0.013)
-0.001
(-0.001)
SQRT(AVG_GCP)
-0.019**
(-0.007)
0.017**
(-0.006)
Lambda
0.123***
(-0.022)
0.0948***
(0.022)
Log-Likelihood - 41982.72
N 54014 54014
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05; n, the number of individuals, T, the number of time 
observations, N, the total number of observations (by month: n = 226, T = 239, N = 54014).
As results show, the number of armed actors and the conflict intensity measurements are highly 
significant; the average GCP is still important, while the population density has only a marginal 
significant impact in the fixed effects model (see Tab. 1). A higher number of VNSAs reduces 
the probability of one-sided violence in Somalia, while more intense fighting increases the 
victimization risk for civilians. The coefficient of lambda – representing the spatially lagged 
dependent variable – indicates a prominent level of autocorrelation within the dependent 
variable. The zero-excess in the dependent count variable could, however, induce a substantial 
downward bias on the standard errors and distort results. Even if this is a suboptimal solution – 
due to the immanent degree of autocorrelation – a negative binomial model could be calculated 
comparatively (e. g. Croissant 2010).
While this exemplary spatiotemporal regression analysis shows that violence against the civilian 
population depends overall on the number of armed non-state actors, it would be guesswork 
to infer the inherent logic/functionality of violence and the effect of territorial control on basis 
of these results. Gaining a profound answer as to whether the variance of violence is rooted in 
the data used or if it is in fact conflict inherent needs further investigation, and the non-normal 
statistical distribution of event data needs to be accounted for.
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6. Concluding Remarks
The variance of violence can partially be a function of the extent of control, the effect of which 
is tested here via the proxy of the level of contestation between armed actors. Nevertheless, 
it would be premature to say (on basis of this working paper) that the manifold problems 
surrounding the measurement of armed actors’ territorial control by making spatiotemporal 
actor presence visible are close to being solved. All the same, information on the actor specific 
level of military capacity, the diffusion of conflict, the (strategic) “value” of a location, or a distinct 
actor constellation can open up the black box of territoriality of armed actors on a sub-state 
level (at least slightly).
The possible pathways to measure and attribute territorial control via the proxy of territorial 
contestation presented here go to some extent beyond what has been done so far quantitatively 
and also beyond the anecdotal evidence of field experts or other qualitative sources. The 
produced statistics can, however, be complementary to the existing procedures used to 
delimit and evaluate local/regional VNSAs presence. If contextualized, however, information 
regarding the probability of armed actors being present at some place within a distinct period 
of time, between two events or within a temporal cluster, could prove very valuable. One major 
problem that all approaches share is the lack of contextual background needed to draw sensible 
conclusions.
This can be the first of many steps that should be taken – but “if our theories are disaggregated, 
then our empirical analyses and research designs should reflect this” (Cederman/Gleditsch 
2009: 490). Spatial and temporal aggregation (Shellman 2004) or disaggregation (Cederman/
Gleditsch 2009: 492; Rød et al. 2010) must match our research questions, the phenomena we 
are looking at and the data at hand. Choosing “downscaling” and the highest possible degree 
of disaggregation is not always sufficient, nor is it always appropriate. What’s more, this data-
driven attempt to retrieve every bit of information can obscure underlying processes for which 
a higher level of aggregation may be more adequate. (Dis-)aggregation is an option, but it should 
be used in a sensible way and relate to the overall research question.
A combined perspective on territorial contestation and the disaggregation of context data would 
benefit the analysis of patterns of violence via delimitating contested areas and increasing the 
level of contextual detail. Though it remains difficult to tell whether the stage of approximation 
will be overcome and robust prediction will be available. There can be little doubt that the 
optimal solution – one that is not as labor intensive and time consuming as those presented 
here – has yet to be found.
The profound usage of remote-sensing data for mapping slash-and-burn practices and crop 
plantations (e. g. ESDIS 2012) – which could tell us whether there are spontaneous campsites of 
displaced refugees or whether an armed actor gave the signal that it is safe to return because 
other armed actors no longer pose a threat and the civilians can harvest what they sowed (Lidow 
2010) – will be especially useful in the coming years. There have also been advances with regard 
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to natural language processing and the coding of non-lethal events from a vast array of news 
outlets (cp. Ickler/Wiesel 2012). The next steps would be near real-time event data gathering (van 
der Windt/Humphreys 2012) and combination with regard to remote sensing data.
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